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TRANSFERRED INTENT
DOUGLAS N. HusAK*
I. THE NEED FOR A THEORY OF TRANSFERRED INTENT
Suppose that Smith shoots at Black with the intention to kill
him. But his aim is bad, and Smith's bullet hits and kills-White, a
clearly visible bystander, instead. Since the early days of the com-
mon law,' all Anglo-American jurisdictions2 hold Smith guilty of
murder by the doctrine of transferred intent.3
The application of the doctrine of transferred intent is
thought to be necessary in order to avoid the result that most
commentators regard as unjust.4 Without this doctrine, it is
widely believed,5 Smith would be guilty of two offenses-the
attempted murder of Black, and some lesser kind of homicide
(presumably manslaughter) of White. The seriousness of these
two offenses, even when combined, is not as great as murder.
Those who think that Smith should be convicted of murder-
and punished accordingly 6-typically appeal to the doctrine of
transferred intent to reach this result. A few theorists, however-
who I will describe as purists-eschew the doctrine and contend
* Professor of Philosophy and Law, Rutgers University.
1. "If A by malice forethought strikes at B and missing him strikes C
whereof he dies, tho he never bore any malice to C yet it is murder, and the law
transfers the malice to the party slain." 1 MATTHEW HALE, HISTORY OF THE
PLEAS OF THE CROWN, 466 (1736).
Perhaps the doctrine was first applied in Regina v. Saunders & Archer, 2
Plowd. 473, 75 Eng. Rep. 706 (1576). No such doctrine was invoked in earlier
cases in which it might have been applied. See Mansell & Herbert's Case, 2 Dyer
128b (1558).
2. One leading treatise indicates that Smith "is uniformly held guilty of
the murder" of White. WAYNE LAFAVE & AUSTIN SCOTT, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL
LAW 399 (1986). But this generalization applies only to Anglo-American law.
German law, for example, rejects the doctrine of transferred intent.
3. In English law, the doctrine is more frequently called "transferred
malice."
4. "Transferred intent is... used to reach what is regarded with virtual
unanimity as ajust result." People v. Czahara, 250 Cal. Rptr. 836, 839 (Ct. App.
1988).
5. Some theorists believe that Smith is guilty of murder without the need
for a special doctrine. For my discussion of the abolitionist position, see infra
Part III.
6. Since the death penalty is available only for murderers, the doctrine of
transferred intent is needed to make Smith eligible for capital punishment.
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that the more defensible outcome is to convict Smith of the two
lesser offenses for which he is undoubtedly liable.7
Why do most theorists suppose that Smith would be inno-
cent of murder in the absence of the doctrine of transferred
intent? My answer must be tentative, since the need for this doc-
trine is usually presupposed rather than defended. My recon-
struction of what I will call the argument for the necessity of transferred
intent is as follows:
(1) Murder is the intentional killing of a human
being.
(2) Smith is guilty of murder only if there exists
some human being who he has killed intention-
ally-in this case, either White or Black.
(3) Smith did not kill Black.
(4) Smith did not kill White intentionally.
Thus, (5) There exists no human being who Smith has
killed intentionally.
Thus, (6) Smith is not guilty of murder.
Exactly how is the doctrine of transferred intent supposed to
undermine this argument? Again, my answer must be specula-
tive, since theorists who invoke the doctrine are neither explicit
nor precise. Surprisingly, no canonical statement of the doctrine
can be found in textbooks, law reviews or cases.' The doctrine
has a name, but no general formulation. Typically, the doctrine
is simply presented as the rationale used to convict Smith of mur-
der. The doctrine itself is inextricably bound with a single case
to which it is applied.
Is the argument for the necessity of transferred intent
sound? Premise (1) of this argument is a definition,9 and prem-
ise (3) is a matter of indisputable fact.1" Our ordinary concep-
tion of intention supports (4).11 Thus it seems that the only
7. See infra Part II.
8. The few general formulations of the doctrine that can be found in case
law are clearly inadequate. Consider the principle invoked in People v.
Matthews, 154 Cal. Rptr. 628, 631 (Ct. App. 1979): "[O]ne's criminal intent
follows the corresponding criminal act to its unintended consequences." Or
consider the principle invoked in State v. Batson, 96 S.W.2d 384, 389 (Mo.
1936): "The intention follows the bullet." If applied consistently, these
principles would seemingly render defendants liable for anything that happened
in the course of an intended killing.
9. But see my brief discussion of felony-murder and depraved heart
murder infra Part III.
10. Even indisputable facts might give way to fictions. For my discussion
of the fiction of transferred death see infra Part V.
11. I assume that (without a doctrine of transferred intent) Smith has not
killed White intentionally in the paradigm case. I make this assumption,
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vulnerable premise in this argument is (2). Indeed, a number of
theorists-who I will describe as abolitionists-reject (or ignore)
(2), even though they favor convicting Smith of murder.1 2 But
the doctrine of transferred intent is clearly designed to oppose
(4). If Smith's intention to kill Black somehow transfers to
White, then (4) becomes-false and White is killed intentionally
after all. 3
Little disagreement is generally expressed about this doc-
trine when it is first introduced to laypersons or to law students.
In the foregoing example-which I will call the paradigm case of
transferred intent-almost all persons concur that Smith should
be punished for murder. Controversy arises in two areas. First,
the overwhelming consensus in favor of punishing Smith for
murder dissolves as examples diverge from the paradigm case. I
will describe many such examples shortly. 4 Second, there is no
agreement about the general rationale for this doctrine. How
and why does Smith's intent transfer to White? Without an
answer to these questions, the doctrine of transferred intent is
nothing more than the name attached to an unexplained
mystery.
My goal in this paper is to relate these two controversies.
This endeavor presupposes the desirability of bringing theory
and practice into "reflective equilibrium."15 There may be little
however, without relying on a conception of intention to support my judgment.
Some theorists may believe that White was killed intentionally. Clearly, there is
room for disagreement about how much of an outcome must proceed
according to plan before that outcome should be described as having been
brought about intentionally. After all, most theorists believe that a victim is
killed intentionally in a case of mistaken identity. Why does a killing count as
intentional when the defendant hits his target but is mistaken about its identity,
but as unintentional when the defendant misses his target but hits someone
else? Although I. will not invoke a conception of intention to answer this
question, Ijoin most commentators in assuming that a satisfactory response can
be provided. I will continue to assume, that is, that White is killed
unintentionally according to our ordinary concept of intention-unless some
special doctrine of the criminal law can be applied to alter this result. For a
useful introduction to many of these issues, see Alfred Mele, Recent Work on
Intentional Action, 29 AM. PHIL. Q. 199 (1992).
12. See infra Part III.
13. Some commentators seem to me to proceed backwards. Instead of
attempting to identify who was killed intentionally, they are convinced that
someone is guilty of an intentional killing. Then they invoke the doctrine of
transferred intent to answer the question: "Someone, however, clearly did
murder the victim, and if not the defendant, who?" See Kimberly Kessler, The
Role of Luck in the Criminal Law, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 2183, 2207 (1994).
14. See infra Part IV.
15. See JOHN RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 120 (1972); JOHN RAWLS,
PoLIrIcAL LIBERALISM 8 (1993).
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need for a general principle as long as persons agree about how
particular cases should be resolved. But a rationale to justify con-
victing Smith of murder in the paradigm case might be useful in
its application to examples that diverge from this paradigm. Or
so I hope. I will present a principle that allows Smith to be pun-
ished as a murderer, and show how it helps to resolve some of
the puzzles about transferred intent on which commentators
tend to disagree. Although I will occasionally claim to have pro-
duced a theory of transferred intent, I do not really construe my
project as a defense of the doctrine. Instead, my project is better
conceptualized as providing an alternative to the doctrine of
transferred intent, that is, a rationale that allows Smith to be pun-
ished as a murderer that does not allege that his intention some-
how transfers from one person to another.
I am not always assured that commentators appreciate that
such a rationale would be desirable. Even after coming to recog-
nize their inability to defend their judgment in the paradigm
case, few persons express serious reservations about the doctrine
of transferred intent. Most persons simply shrug off their inabil-
ity, and continue to support the doctrine as though no problem
exists. This reaction is curious.16 The willingness to live in a
state of reflective disequilibrium should be tolerated with only
the greatest reluctance.
In Part II of this paper, I will critique the purist position
about transferred intent. Although the purist cannot be refuted,
his rationale for failing to punish Smith as a murderer is not alto-
gether unproblematic. In Part III, I will respond to those theo-
rists who contend that Smith can be convicted of murder without
the need for a special doctrine. In Part IV, I will describe various
kinds of nonstandard examples of transferred intent, that is,
hypotheticals that deviate from the paradigm case in specified
respects. An adequate theory of transferred intent should help
to decide whether and to what extent defendants in these exam-
ples should be punished. In Part V, I will establish what many
theorists take for granted: the doctrine of transferred intent is a
legal fiction that should not be construed literally. I will suggest
16. Curious, but not altogether unprecedented. On a wide range of
matters, philosophers seem to be confident that their judgments must be
correct, despite their inability to defend them-even to their own satisfaction.
Punishment provides an example. Legal philosophers have struggled for
centuries tojustify this practice, and no purported justification has emerged as
thoroughly convincing. Still, only a handful of philosophers have concluded
from this failure that punishment may actually be unjustified. On some such
issues, perhaps we should have more confidence in our intuitive judgments
than in our ability to support them with principled arguments.
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that fictions are best avoided by supposing that the basis for pun-
ishing Smith as a murderer is a principle of sentencing theory
rather than a doctrine of the substantive criminal law. In Part VI,
I will argue against a popular rationale in favor of this doctrine-
which I call the compensation for luck thesis. In Part VII, I will
defend a preferable approach to the paradigm case, and will
apply it to help resolve some of the nonstandard examples of
transferred intent I have identified.
II. A CRITIQUE OF PURISM
In what I have described as the paradigm case of transferred
intent, Smith shoots at Black with the intention to kill him, but
misses because of a bad aim, and hits and kills White, a clearly
visible bystander, instead. Most commentators believe that Smith
should be punished as a murderer. I share this judgment. The
ultimate challenge I undertake is to provide a general rationale
to support this intuition. A few theorists, however-who I
describe as purists-believe that the argument for the necessity of
transferred intent is sound, yet infer that the more defensible
outcome is to punish Smith for the attempted murder of Black
and some lesser kind of homicide (presumably manslaughter) of
White. 7 In this Part, I will present my reservations about the
purist position.
The judgment of the purist about the paradigm case strikes
most theorists as highly counterintuitive. Nonetheless, purism
has a number of theoretical advantages. The purist can afford to
be smug, as he confidently responds to unsuccessful attempts to
support a rationale that allows Smith to be convicted of murder.
The purist can claim to have integrity, as he steadfastly refuses to
compromise his principles to reach results he cannot defend.
And the purist can depict himself as the champion of the princi-
ple of legality, as he staunchly protests against punishing Smith
for a crime he did not commit. For all these reasons, the purist
occupies the moral high ground. His position must be taken
respectfully and seriously. Indeed, I will concede that there are
several matters about which the purist is correct-but his unwill-
ingness to punish Smith as a murderer is not among them.
Purism has two distinct motivations." The theoretical purist
acknowledges the force of those intuitions that would punish
17. Some purists attack the doctrine of transferred intent as "an historical
aberration" and argue that it "should be rejected." DON STUART, CANADIAN
CRIMINAL LAW 196-97 (1982).
18. Sometimes it may be unclear on which ground purism is endorsed.
When Glanville Williams, for example, describes the doctrine of transferred
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Smith for murder. Still, he questions why these intuitions should
be trusted when they are opposed by principles in which he has
even greater confidence. This purist is not happy to live in a
state of reflective disequilibrium, but has found no way to recon-
cile his principles with his intuitions. He understands why many
commentators sympathize with the doctrine of transferred
intent, but ultimately finds the doctrine dissatisfying-even after
he is assured that it is only a legal fiction.19 Fictions have no
place in purist theory. The theoretical purist will not be per-
suaded unless a non-fictitious rationale to punish Smith as a mur-
derer can be defended. Ultimately, I will attempt to provide such
a rationale.2 °
Unlike his theoretical counterpart, the intuitive purist does
not share the judgment of most commentators who believe that
Smith should be punished for murder. He does not understand
why commentators would go to such extraordinary lengths to try
to find a rationale to convict Smith of a crime for which he is
simply not liable. This kind of purist may be the most difficult to
persuade. If he sincerely reports intuitions at odds with those of
most persons, no viable strategy may convince him. Progress is
nearly impossible in the face of a deep conflict of intuitions. Per-
haps all that can be accomplished is to describe additional cases
with seemingly counterintuitive implications that encourage him
to reconsider his unusual judgments. I now attempt to describe
such a "hard case" for the intuitive purist.
Suppose that Arthur intends to kill two victims. He i's
amazed at his good fortune when he sees both his intended vic-
tims in close proximity. He carefully aims at each, and quickly
fires two bullets. Both victims drop dead. The subsequent
autopsy reveals that the bullet he aimed at his first intended vic-
tim hit and killed the second intended victim instead, and the
bullet he aimed at his second intended victim hit and killed the
first intended victim instead. The argument for the necessity of
transferred intent-defended as sound by the purist who would
acquit Smith of murder in the paradigm case-seems equally
applicable here. The difficulty is to identify a person who Arthur
has killed intentionally. No such person exists. Just as in the par-
adigm case, the acts by which Arthur killed are not intentional
killings. Unless the purist can find some ingenious way to distin-
guish this case from the paradigm, he must find Arthur innocent
intent as "an arbitrary exception to normal principles," it is not apparent that
he believes it leads to an unjust outcome. GLANviuE W-iuis, CmMINAL LAW:
THE GENERAL PART 134 (2d ed. 1961).
19. See infra Part V.
20. See infra Part VII.
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of both murders. On the level of intuition, I doubt that anyone
is happy with this result.
Only purists will regard this case as difficult. If Smith should
be punished for murder in the paradigm case, in which he had
no intention to kill the person he actually killed, there is even
more reason to punish Arthur for murder. After all, Arthur had
an intention to kill the person he actually killed, even though the
act by which he killed this person was intended to kill some other
person who he also intended to kill.
If the intuitive purist refuses to budge here, he is unlikely to
be persuaded by any other argument of which I am aware. The
purist cannot be refuted. His position is coherent and plausible.
The most that can be done is to provide a rationale to convince
the theoretical purist-who should at least welcome the effort.
But if no rationale suffices to persuade him to revise his princi-
ples-and if no example manages to convince him to reconsider
his intuitions-all that remains to be said is that reasonable
minds may differ in their judgments.
III. THE ABOLITIONIST APPROACH TO TRANSFERRED INTENT
Before looking at various nonstandard examples of trans-
ferred intent and examining rationales for the doctrine of trans-
ferred intent that can be applied to those examples, it is crucial
to respond to a train of thought that a few theorists have found
seductive. I will call this train of thought the abolitionist approach
to the doctrine of transferred intent. Unlike purists, who deny
that Smith should be punished for murder, abolitionists agree
that Smith is guilty of murder-but without recourse to a special
doctrine such as transferred intent.
At least three rationales other than the doctrine of trans-
ferred intent might be invoked to convict Smith of murder.2' I
will mention the first two such rationales briefly. These two ratio-
nales purport to convict Smith of murder even though he lacked
the intention to kill Black. Each rationale rejects premise (1) of
the argument for the necessity of transferred intent. In other
words, they supplement the definition of murder as the inten-
tional killing of a human being. Some murders do not involve
intentional killings.
The first rationale convicts Smith of murder by applying the
felony-murder rule. Although the details of this rule present a host
of complexities I need not unravel here, the least qualified form
21. Yet another possible rationale is to claim that White is killed
intentionally according to our ordinary conception of intention. See supra note
11.
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of the rule holds defendants guilty of felony-murder if they kill
someone during the commission of a felony. 2 Since Smith's
attempted murder of Black is a felony, and White is killed in the
commission of this felony, the felony-murder rule would hold
Smith guilty of murder, even though he did not kill White
intentionally.
The second rationale convicts Smith of murder by applying
what is sometimes called depraved-heart murder. In most jurisdic-
tions, a defendant need not actually intend to kill-or even to
cause grievous bodily harm-in order to possess the degree of
culpability required for murder. Gross recklessness, amounting
to an extreme indifference to the value of human life, is suffi-
cient to convict a defendant of depraved-heart murder.2" Since
Smith's attempt to kill someone while a bystander is clearly visi-
ble exhibits an extreme indifference to the value of human life,
Smith is guilty of depraved-heart murder, even though he did
not kill White intentionally.
Despite their clear relevance and significance, I pay little
attention to these two rationales here. Both are in some respects
broader in scope, and in other respects narrower in scope, than
the doctrine of transferred intent. Moreover, these rationales-
especially the felony-murder rule-are at least as controversial as
the doctrine of transferred intent itself.2 * Because of this contro-
versy, a few jurisdictions have eliminated the felony-murder
rule.25 But my most important reason for focusing on the doc-
trine of transferred intent is that these alternatives are not espe-
cially useful for the task at hand. However relevant these two
rationales may be for convicting Smith, they are inapplicable to
many of the nonstandard cases I have described. In several of
these cases, the defendant neither commits a felony nor exhibits
an extreme indifference to the value of human life. Thus the
22. See 4 WnitAM BLAcxsrorE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
*200-01.
23. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(l)(b) (1962).
24. "The reason why the felony-murder rule is, and the transferred malice
rule is not, objectionable, is that the one is unjust and the other just." Rupert
Cross, The Reports of the Criminal Law Commissioners (1833-1849) and the Abortive
Bills of 1853, in RESHAPING THE CRIMINAL LAw 5, 20 (P.R. Glazebrook ed., 1978).
"Criticism of the [felony-murder] rule constitutes a lexicon of everything that
scholars and jurists can find wrong with a legal doctrine." Nelson Roth & Scott
Sunby, The Felony-Murder Rule: A Doctrine at Constitutional Crossroads, 70 CORNELL
L. REv. 446, 446 (1985).
25. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRrMINAL LAw 479 n.110 (2d
ed. 1995). The MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(1)(b) (1962), replaces the felony-
murder rule with a rebuttable presumption of aggravated recklessness with
respect to deaths caused in the commission of certain dangerous felonies.
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doctrine of transferred intent continues to survive independently
of these two rationales, and must be scrutinized on its own
merits.
I will discuss the third rationale-the abolitionist approach-
for convicting Smith of murder in somewhat more detail. Aboli-
tionists do not invoke some other special rule (such as felony-mur-
der or depraved-heart murder) to convict Smith. Instead, the
abolitionist approach is unique in rejecting premise (2) of the
argument for the necessity of transferred intent. In other words,
abolitionists reject the conditional that a person is guilty of mur-
der only if there exists some human being who he has killed
intentionally. 26
Joshua Dressler is among those theorists who endorse the
abolitionist approach.27 After presenting the paradigm case, he
writes:
The transferred intent doctrine is unnecessary
and.. .potentially misleading.... In [the paradigm] case,
there is no need to transfer [Smith's] intention to kill
[Black] to [White]; [Smith] has the requisite intent without
the doctrine. The social harm of murder is the "killing of a
human being by another human being." The requisite
intent, therefore, is the intent to kill a, not a specific,
human being. In the [paradigm] case, [Smith] intended
to kill a human being ([Black]), and he did in fact kill a
human being ([White]). Thus, the actus reus and mens rea
of murder are proved without invoking the legal fiction of
transferred intent. 28
According to abolitionists such as Dressier, the required mens rea
of murder is simply the intent to kill a human being, that is, the
intent to kill some one or another. Smith, like murderers who suc-
ceed in killing their intended victims, has this intent. Thus
26. Sometimes the abolitionist approach is precluded by statute.
Suppose, for example, that a statute proscribes "harming a person with the
intent to cause such person ...... The identity of the intended and actual
victims must coincide in applying this statute.
27. Previous theorists have provided more cryptic expressions of the
abolitionist position. One leading treatise indicates that "while the 'transferred
intent' theory does not reach erroneous conclusions [in the paradigm case], it
is unnecessary even here. The true explanation is this: In every such case both
components of the crime are present. The psychical element consists of a
certain general mental pattern which is not varied by the particular person or
piece of property which may be actually harmed." ROLLIN PERIUNS & RONALD
BOYCE, CRiMINAL LAw 923 (3d ed. 1982). In the same section, however, with no
acknowledgment of the incongruity, this treatise defines murder as "homicide
committed with malice aforethought against the deceased." Id. at 924.
28. DRESSLER, supra note 25, at 109.
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Smith has the intent required for murder, even though he kills a
person other than his intended victim.
Abolitionists sometimes bolster their analysis by presenting
hypotheticals in which a conviction for murder is beyond dis-
pute. Consider Tom the terrorist. He perches atop a tower and
resolves to shoot at a crowd of students until he finally kills some-
one, although he is indifferent about the identity of his ultimate
victim. After taking aim at several persons and firing several
rounds, he eventually succeeds in killing Jill. No one would
think that Tom lacks the intent to kill. Thus it seems that a per-
son need not intend to kill someone in particular in order to
possess the intent required for murder. An intent to kill some
one or another will suffice. Why, then, is the doctrine of trans-
ferred intent needed in the paradigm case? Smith, like Tom,
had the intent to kill some one or another.
I am skeptical of the abolitionist approach in its application
to the paradigm case. If murder is the intentional killing of a
human being, I find it hard to see how Smith is clearly guilty of
murder unless there exists some human being who he has killed
intentionally: Here is a classic scope problem.29 The ambiguity
is in the scope of the existential quantifier that symbolizes the
indefinite article "a" in the statute that proscribes the intentional
killing of a human being. The intent may be to kill anyone, or to
kill someone in particular. As far "as I can see, there is no clear
basis for resolving this ambiguity one way or the other. Perhaps a
"rule of lenity" or principle of "strict statutory construction"-if
they exist at all° 5-apply to resolve this ambiguity in favor of the
defendant. In any event, abolitionists encounter difficulty in
drafting an indictment to charge Smith with murder. The doc-
trine of transferred intent allows Smith to be prosecuted for the
murder of White. Without this doctrine, would the indictment
simply specify that Smith had the abstract intent to kill some one
or another, but had not intentionally killed anyone who could be
named?31 This difficulty provides one reason-I do not pretend
it is decisive-to be dissatisfied with the abolitionist approach.
What about Tom the terrorist? It seems likely that there
exists a human being who Tom has killed intentionally, and here
lies the important difference between Smith and Tom. The use
of the adverb "intentionally" is misplaced in describing Smith's
29. See generally WniARw V.O. QUINE, WORD AND OBJECT 146-51 (1960)
(discussing opacity and indefinite terms).
30. See DRESSLER, supra note 25, at 35.
31. See Ashworth, Transferred Malice and Punishment for Unforeseen
Consequences, in RESHAPING THE CRIMINAL LAw, supra note 24, at 84-85.
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act of killing; White was killed accidentally rather than intention-
ally. But Jill, unlike White, was probably killed intentionally
rather than accidentally. Tom's hypothetical only demonstrates
that a murderer need not care about the identity of his victim to
kill her intentionally-not that a murderer need not have killed
some human being intentionally."2 Thus this hypothetical fails
to show that Smith can be convicted of murder without invoking
a special doctrine such as transferred intent."
IV. TWELVE NONSTANDARD EXAMPLES OF TRANSFERRED INTENT
My goal in this Part is to generate what I call twelve nonstan-
dard examples of transferred intent.3 4 I do so by identifying
twelve of the most important characteristics of the paradigm
case. 3 Various kinds of nonstandard examples that deviate from
this paradigm can be constructed by altering one or more of
these characteristics.3 6 The question is whether the defendant
32. Williams cryptically explains this result as follows: "In general
intention, no particular victim is intended (e.g., firing into a crowd), but the
intent may be laid as an intent to hurt the particular victim who was hurt."
WiLLLis, supra note 18, at 125.
33. Other hypotheticals designed to obviate the need for the doctrine of
transferred intent fare even less well. No such doctrine is needed, for example,
when the defendant aims at the heart of his intended victim, but kills by hitting
him in the head. In this hypothetical, the victim is still killed intentionally.
Some commentators apparently believe that this hypothetical helps to show that
no doctrine of transferred intent is required to convict Smith of murder in the
paradigm case. SeeJ.C. SMIH & BRLAN HoGAN, CRamINAL LAw 64 (5th ed. 1983).
34. More precisely, the twelve examples I generate simply diverge from
the paradigm in specified respects; I do not mean to beg questions by
describing them as cases of transferred intent.
35. An example I regard as nonstandard might conform to what some
other theorist regards as a different paradigm of transferred intent. At least
one commentator treats the clear visibility of the bystander as inessential to the
paradigm. He writes: "The paradigm case [of transferred malice] is where D
throws an object at 0, intending to injure 0, and the object injures P who walks
through the door unexpectedly." Ashworth, supra note 31, at 77.
36. No importance attaches to the order in which I present these
deviations. Moreover, nothing of special significance depends on my
purporting to identify twelve distinct characteristics; greater or lesser numbers
could be recognized. Perhaps I draw too many distinctions. For example, one
might assimilate the fourth and fifth features, or the tenth and eleventh
features.
Perhaps, however, I draw too few distinctions. Consider just three of the
many additional possibilities I have neglected. First, the offense charged in the
paradigm case is murder. I assume but do not discuss whether the doctrine of
transferred intent is applicable to other offenses. Moreover, the paradigm case
involves the firing of a gun. Before the popularity of firearms, most cases of
transferred intent involved the administration of poisons or the shooting of
arrows. I assume but do not discuss whether the same principles apply to all
19961
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still should be punished for murder (or murders) when given
characteristics of this paradigm are modified.
This question could be answered much more easily if com-
mentators agreed on a general formulation of the doctrine of
transferred intent. A general principle could be applied to a spe-
cific set of facts to yield a definitive outcome. But as long as the
doctrine is simply the name of the device used to convict Smith
of murder in the paradigm case, rather than the implementation
of a more general thesis, doubts about its application to nonstan-
dard examples are inevitable. Theorists have little choice but to
rely on their intuitions in deciding whether the doctrine contin-
ues to apply.
Intuitions about how these subsequent twelve examples
should be resolved can be sorted into three categories. The
alteration from the paradigm is irrelevant to the outcome in what
I will call type A deviations. Intuitions about punishing Smith for
murder are just as strong as in the paradigm case. The alteration
from the paradigm is sufficient to change the outcome in what I
will call type B deviations. Intuitions are strong that Smith should
not be punished for murder. The effect of the alteration from
the paradigm is doubtful and unclear in what I will call type C
deviations. The need for a theory of transferred intent is most
urgent in the context of these latter examples. Of course, I
should not be dogmatic in categorizing given alterations from
the paradigm as instances of type A, B, or C deviations. Although
I will report my own intuitions, and hope that they are represen-
tative of most thoughtful persons, I am aware that reasonable
minds may disagree about some of the particular intuitions I
regard as clear. Nothing will depend on the accuracy of each of
my intuitive judgments. What is crucial is that a satisfactory the-
ory of transferred intent succeeds in sorting cases into whatever
categories are believed to be appropriate.
The twelve salient characteristics of the paradigm case are as
follows. First, Smith intended to kill. Second, Smith intended to
kill a person. Third, Smith intended to kill a person other than
himself. Fourth, Smith did not kill the person he attempted to
kill. Fifth, Smith failed to hit and injure the person he attempted
to kill. Sixth, Smith killed his unintended victim by accident
rather than by mistake. Seventh, the act by which Smith
manners of killings. Finally, the attempt to kill the intended victim in the
paradigm case fails because of a shortcoming on the part of the defendant: his
aim is bad. I assume but do not discuss whether the same results follow if the
attempt to kill fails from some other kind of cause, such as an unexpected gust
of wind.
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attempted to kill his intended victim proximately caused the
death of his unintended victim. Eighth, the unintended victim
was clearly visible to Smith. Ninth, no statute augments the
severity of the punishment for killing either the intended or the
unintended victim. Tenth, the intended victim made no active
contribution to the death of the unintended victim. Eleventh,
the unintended victim made no active contribution to his own
death. Twelfth, Smith had no justification for attempting to kill
his intended victim. In the remainder of this Part, I will describe
examples that deviate from the paradigm in each of these twelve
respects.
The first characteristic of the paradigm is that Smith
intended to kill. Suppose, however, that a defendant lacked the
intention to kill. A defendant who kills may have had no culpa-
ble state at all, or may have had a culpable state less than inten-
tion. Such examples might be represented along a continuum,
with the culpable state coming closer and closer to intention.
Suppose that a defendant is not even negligent; a reasonable per-
son would have done what he did. Or suppose that he is merely
negligent; a reasonable person would not have done what he did.
Or suppose that he is reckless; he consciously disregarded a sub-
stantial and unjustifiable risk of death. All such examples are
type B deviations; the defendant should not be punished for the
murder of the bystander. If a defendant lacks the intention to
kill, he should not be punished for an offense that requires this
intention."8 Perhaps the defendant should be liable for the kind
of homicide (if any) that corresponds to his degree of culpabil-
ity-when he is reckless with respect to one person, for example,
he might be liable for the manslaughter of another person who
he actually kills as a result of his reckless behavior" 9 -but I need
not discuss such questions here.
The second characteristic of the paradigm is that Smith
intended to kill a person. Suppose, however, that a defendant
intended to kill something other than a person. Suppose that he
took aim at Blackie the duck, but killed a human bystander
37. Here I assume that culpable states can be sequentially ordered. For a
discussion of this assumption, see Douglas Husak, The Sequential Principle of
Relative Culpability, LEGAL THEORY (forthcoming).
38. I discuss two exceptions to this generalization infra Part IV. In manyjurisdictions, extreme recklessness may be a sufficient degree of culpability to
allow a conviction of murder. Moreover, a defendant may be liable for murder
by an application of the felony murder rule.
39. "There is no reason why recklessness should not be capable of
transfer as well as intention." WILLIAMS, supra note 18, at 127.
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instead. Again, this example is clearly a type B deviation; the
defendant should not be punished for murder.'
The third characteristic of the paradigm is that Smith
intended to kill a person other than himself. Suppose, however,
that a defendant managed to kill a bystander while attempting to
kill himself.4" Here the outcome is somewhat less clear than in
the previous two examples. Still, I categorize this example as a
type B deviation. This classification is bound to arouse contro-
versy. Theorists should demand an explanation of why the inten-
tion to kill does not transfer in cases of attempted suicide.42
Some generalizations invoked by commentators-such as the
"intent follows the bullet"4"-are falsified by this example.
The fourth characteristic of the paradigm is that Smith did
not actually kill Black, the person he attempted to kill. Suppose,
however, that a defendant did kill the person he attempted to
kill. In almost all such cases, the defendant is clearly guilty of
murder." But difficulties arise if the defendant kills someone
else in the course of killing the person he attempted to kill. Is
the defendant then guilty of two murders?45 If so, he is guilty of
more than one crime that requires intent, even though he had
only a single intention to kill. Many factual variations on this
theme are possible. Suppose that a defendant fired a single bul-
let that passed through his intended victim, killing him and a
bystander as well. Or suppose that a defendant fired several bul-
lets in a drive-by shooting, killing both his intended victim and a
dozen bystanders. Is he guilty of thirteen murders? Arguably,
there are important distinctions to be drawn between these varia-
40. This result follows in the absence of a special rule to the contrary. See
the exception in the case of depraved-heart murder discussed supra Part III.
41. A number of English cases are cited in WiLLLs, supra note 18, at 126
n.5.
42. Perhaps intentions do not transfer in all cases in which persons
intend to kill, but only in those cases in which persons perform the actus reus of
homicide. Since homicide is defined as the killing of a human being other than
onese/f, the question of whether the intention transfers in cases of attempted
suicide does not arise.
43. State v. Batson, 96 S.W.2d 384, 389 (Mo. 1936).
44. An exception would arise if the defendant killed his intended victim
by a deviant causal chain.
45. Courts have disagreed. See People v. Birreuta, 208 Cal. Rptr. 635 (Ct.
App. 1984). The court concluded-correctly, I think-that the defendant
murdered his intended victim, but was guilty only of manslaughter with respect
to the unintended victim. But see State v. Rodrigues-Gonzalez, 790 P.2d 287,
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1990). The court concluded-incorrectly, I think-that the
defendant was guilty of multiple murders. It stated: "Intent to murder is
transferable to each unintended victim once there is an attempt to kill
someone." Id. at 288.
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tions. If a single bullet is fired, the theorist might be forced to
choose whether the intention that accompanies this act does or
does not transfer; he cannot have it both ways. If the intention
transfers, the first victim is killed unintentionally; if the intention
does not transfer, the second victim is killed unintentionally.' A
doctrine to hold the defendant guilty of multiple murders when
his single bullet kills both an intended and an unintended victim
might be named reproduced or duplicated intent rather than trans-
ferred intent.47 Perhaps, however, the firing of several bullets
should be regarded as many distinct criminal acts, and the ques-
tion of whether intentions transfer can arise anew with respect to
each successive act.4' In any event, some or all of these examples
seem to me to be type C deviations. A theory of transferred intent
is required to resolve them.
The fifth characteristic of the paradigm is that Smith failed
to hit and injure Black, the person he attempted to kill. Sup-
pose, however, that a defendant actually succeeds in hitting and
severely injuring, but not in killing his attempted victim. In
almost all such cases, the defendant is clearly guilty of aggravated
assault.49 Once again, however, difficulties arise if the defendant
kills someone else in the course of wounding the person he
attempted to kill. Is the defendant then guilty of two intentional
crimes? The factual variations on this theme are similar to those
discussed in the previous example. If a defendant performs a
single intentional act, his intention must be reproduced or dupli-
cated rather than transferred in order to convict him of more
than one intentional crime. At least some of these variations are
type C deviations that demand a theoretical resolution.
The sixth characteristic of the paradigm is that Smith killed
White, his unintended victim, by accident rather than by mistake.
Suppose, however, that a defendant killed his victim by mistake
46. One commentator suggests that A's intention to kill B, the intended
victim, cannot be transferred to C, the unintended victim, "because the 'intent'
has been 'used up' against B." DRESSLER, supra note 25, at 108. Not all courts,
however, have agreed with this analysis. Some hold the defendant guilty of two
murders on the ground that "intent is not regarded as a limited commodity
that, once satisfied, is totally expended." State v. Hinton, 630 A.2d 593, 596 n.8
(Conn. 1993).
47. I assume that the firing of a single bullet is a single intentional act.
For an alternative principle of act-individuation, see Alvin Goldman, Action and
Crime: A Fine-Grained Approach, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 1563 (1994).
48. Such a case may not require a single intent to be duplicated or
reproduced; intent may be transferred to each victim who is killed by a
successive bullet. According to one commentator, "there is enough intent to go
around." DRESSLER, supra note 25, at 108 n.43.
49. See the qualification supra note 44.
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rather than by accident. The distinction is straightforward. Mis-
takes occur in the realm of perception; they involve false beliefs.
Accidents, by contrast, occur in the realm of causation; they need
not involve false beliefs.5 ° Suppose, then, that a defendant took
aim at a person with the intention to kill him, but that he errone-
ously believed his target to be a different person. All jurisdic-
tions treat such cases of mistaken identity as type A deviations;
the defendant is guilty of murder.51
The seventh characteristic of the paradigm is that the act by
which Smith attempted to kill Black proximately caused White's
death.52 Suppose, however, that the act by which a defendant
attempted to kill was not the proximate cause of the victim's
death. Instead, suppose that the unintended victim was killed
through what might be called a deviant causal chain. Suppose,
for example, that the unintended victim died from an infection
when his minor wound was exposed to bacteria after he carelessly
drove his car into a swamp on his way to a doctor. These exam-
ples are easily resolved. After all, a sufficiently deviant causal
chain precludes liability for murder when the defendant's
attempt to kill is a "but-for" cause of death of his intended victim.
Examples that involve a comparably deviant causal chain
between a defendant's attempt and the death of an unintended
victim are even more readily classified as type B deviations.5"
The eighth characteristic of the paradigm is that White was
clearly visible to Smith. This feature helps to establish Smith's
level of culpability with respect to his unintended victim. Smith
must have been reckless with respect to White's death; he must
have been aware that his act might kill White instead of (or in
addition to) Black. Suppose, however, that the unintended vic-
50. See GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAw 487 (1978).
51. For better or worse, most criminal codes address mistake and
accident differently. The MODEL PENAL CODE treats mistake in § 2.04, and
would hold the defendant liable for murder since he "would be guilty of
another offense had the situation been as he supposed." MODEL PENAL CODE
Sec. 2.04 (1962). For a brief critical discussion of the differential treatment of
accident and mistake, see Paul Robinson, Imputed Criminal Liability, 93 YALE L. J.
609 (1984).
52. I do not invoke a theory of proximate causation to support this claim.
Indeed, no commentator has produced an adequate theory of causation,
proximate or otherwise. For a useful introduction, see CAUSATION, (Ernest Sosa
& Michael Tooley, eds., 1993).
53. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03(2) (1962) treats cases of transferred intent
as issues of causation. The defendant is liable for murder unless the harm "is
not too remote or accidental in its occurrence to have a [just] bearing on the
actor's liability." This treatment, I think, is insufficient to provide much
guidance in helping to resolve many of the nonstandard examples of
transferred intent.
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timi was not clearly visible to the defendant at the time of the
shooting. Suppose, then, that a defendant was not reckless or
even negligent with respect to the death of the victim. Some the-
orists have contested whether such a defendant should be guilty
of murder. According to Glanville Williams, the "plain man's
view of justice" restricts the doctrine of transferred intent to
"cases where the consequence was brought about by negligence
in relation to the actual victim."5 4 My intuitions are far more
ambivalent. I am prepared to categorize this example as a type C
deviation and await the application of a theory of transferred
intent.
The ninth characteristic of the paradigm is that no statute
augments the severity of the punishment for killing either Black
or White. Some statutes increase the punishment that can be
imposed for killing persons of a given status; killing a politician, a
judge, or a law enforcement officer is frequently a more serious
crime.5 5 Suppose, however, that the intended and the unin-
tended victims have a different legal status. Two distinct scena-
rios are possible. Suppose that the statute augments the
punishment for killing the unintended victim. Suppose that
Oswald intended to kill Jackie, but hit and killed President John
instead.5 6 Is Oswald eligible for the more severe punishment
that applies to the assassination of the president? Or suppose
that the statute augments the punishment for killing the
intended victim. Suppose that Oswald intended to kill President
John, but hit and killed Jackie instead.5 7 Is he eligible for the
more severe punishment?5 8 At least the former, and perhaps
both of these examples strike me as type C deviations.
54. WILIAMs, supra note 18, at 133.
55. Some statutes make killing such persons a variety of capital murder
rather than ordinary murder. See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(a) (1)
(West 1994).
56. See U.S. v. Montoya, 739 F.2d 1437 (9th Cir. 1984). The court held
that all that transferred was the intent to strike another person, not the intent
to strike the federal officer. But see State v. Cantua-Ramirez, 718 P.2d 1030
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1986), where the court imposed the augmented punishment for
abuse of a child when the defendant accidentally struck a baby while trying to
hit its mother.
57. The augmented penalty would be imposed if one holds that "the
severity of the offense predicated on the doctrine of transferred intent is that
applicable had the intended victim been the one injured." Mordica v. State,
618 So. 2d. 301, 304 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
58. Again, I am supposing that the unintended victim is killed by accident
rather than by mistake. Arguably, different issues arise when the defendant is
mistaken about the status of the person he intends to kill. See U.S. v. Feola, 420
U.S. 671 (1975).
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The tenth characteristic of the paradigm is that Black made
no active contribution to the death of White. Suppose, however,
that the intended victim actively contributed to the death of the
unintended victim. The active contribution made by the
intended victim can vary along a continuum. Perhaps the least
significant contribution involves simply ducking the bullet.
Slightly more troublesome are examples in which the intended
victim somehow deflects the bullet onto another person. 59
Although most such cases are type A deviations, a few are type B
deviations. The intuitive judgment that the defendant is guilty of
murder dissolves if the intended victim could easily have pre-
vented anyone from dying, but chose for his own malicious rea-
sons to ensure that someone else would be harmed. Suppose, for
example, that a defendant threw a bomb with a lit fuse toward his
intended victim. Even though the intended victim knew he
could easily extinguish the fuse, he instead tossed the bomb
toward someone else, who was killed in the explosion.6" Some-
where along the continuum between these type A and type B
deviations lie type C deviations. Suppose, for example, that the
intended victim escapes from an ambush by deliberately inter-
posing a number of innocent persons as shields. Reasonable
minds might differ about whether the defendant should be guilty
of murder when the intended victim makes this degree of contri-
bution to the death of the unintended victims.
The eleventh characteristic of the paradigm is that White
made no active contribution to his own death. Suppose, how-
ever, that the unintended victim actively contributed to his own
death. Again, the active contribution of the unintended victim
can vary along a continuum. Suppose that Kevin was a body-
guard employed to protect Whitney, and that he jumped in front
of the bullet to save the life of his employer. This deviation is
type A. But suppose that a defendant threw a bomb with a lit
fuse toward his intended victim. The unintended victim discov-
ered the bomb, and knew she could easily extinguish the fuse.
Instead, she chose to martyr herself by throwing her body on the
bomb, dying in the subsequent explosion. Here is a clear type B
59. Many examples are discussed in Christopher Boorse & Roy Sorensen,
Ducking Harm, 85J. PHI. 115 (1988).
60. These cases may break the causal connection between the act of
attempted killing and the death of the victim by what H.L.A. Hart and Antony
Honore describe as the voluntary intervention principle in H.LA. HART & TONY
HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAw (2d ed. 1985). For a critical discussion of this
principle, see Joel Feinberg, Causing.Voluntay Actions, in DOING AND DESERVING
152 (Joel Feinberg, ed., 1970).
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deviation. Somewhere along the continuum between these type
A and type B deviations lie type C deviations.
The twelfth and final characteristic of the paradigm is that
Smith had no justification for attempting to kill White. Suppose,
however, that a defendant was justified in shooting at his
intended victim. Suppose that he fired at his intended victim in
self-defense, but killed an innocent bystander instead. Most such
examples are type B deviations.61 But intuitions may be less clear
if the defendant killed several innocent persons in the course of
justifiably shooting at his intended victim.
In reflecting on these twelve deviations from the paradigm
case, the relative dearth of type A deviations merits special atten-
tion. In only a very few situations should the defendant be pun-
ished for murder when the facts of the paradigm are altered. Far
more common are type B deviations, in which the modification
of the facts suffices to change the outcome of the case. Of great-
est interest, however, are the many type C deviations, about
which our intuitions are unclear. The need for a theory of trans-
ferred intent becomes evident in light of the sheer number of
these problematic examples.
V. THE DOCTRINE AS LEGAL FICTION
How might we obtain some guidance to resolve the many
type C deviations? My hope is that a theory of transferred intent
that helps to explain cases about which we are clear-the para-
digm case as well as nonstandard type A and B deviations-can
be brought to bear on those cases about which our intuitions are
ambivalent or silent.
One possible approach to these questions is to refine our
understanding of the precise circumstances under which inten-
tions actually transfer. Suppose there were some fact of the mat-
ter about when intentions really transfer that could be discovered
through careful philosophical analysis. If so, philosophical analy-
sis would provide the very best method for resolving our uncer-
tainty about type C deviations. Indeed, there would be little
excuse to pursue any other means to dispel our confusion.
This approach, however, is altogether fanciful. I am una-
ware of any theorist who has taken or would take this possibility
seriously. Most commentators are quick to label the doctrine of
61. "When the fault is transferred, any defence which D might have had is
transferred with it." ANDREW ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAw (2d ed.,
forthcoming January 1996) (manuscript at 198, on file with author) (citations
omitted).
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transferred intent as a "fiction."62 Thus theorists do not really
believe that intentions actually transfer; clearly, there is no fact of
the matter about transferred intent that can be discovered
through philosophical analysis. The fictitious nature of this doc-
trine may be too obvious to belabor. I think, however, that this
conclusion should be defended rather than assumed. In this
Part, I will show why the rationale for holding Smith liable for
murder in the paradigm case cannot be that his culpable state
with respect to Black somehow actually "transfers" to White. I
will conclude by suggesting how a fictitious rationale for punish-
ing Smith as a murderer can be avoided.
Are intentions the kind of things that can transfer? Answer-
ing this question proves doubly difficult. First, there is doubt
about exactly what is meant by transfer, second, the nature of
intention is notoriously unclear. In what follows, I will comment
briefly on each of these two difficulties. Despite my best efforts
to provide a charitable and sympathetic interpretation of the
doctrine, I am ultimately unable to make much sense of the
claim that the culpable states required for murder are the kind
of things that can or do transfer. This conclusion should help to
pave the way toward consideration of non-fictitious rationales to
explain our intuitive judgments.
The word "transfer" is used most frequently as a verb in
property law, as when one person conveys to another possession
or title.6" This conveyance brings about a change or alteration in
legal status; one person gains what another person loses. Per-
haps the doctrine of transferred intent involves a similar transfor-
mation. By an application of this doctrine, Smith's intention to
kill Black is somehow changed or altered into an intention to kill
White. This transformation renders Smith guilty of an inten-
tional killing-a murder-of White.
Can intentions be transformed in this way? Unfortunately,
no widely-used conception of intention is available to answer this
question.' The difficulties of locating the boundaries of inten-
tion are so formidable that many modem criminal codes, follow-
ing the lead of the Model Penal Code, have all but abandoned
the use of the concept. Uncertainty about whether a person
intends the consequences he knows his action will bring about,
62. This doctrine is described as an "arrant, bare-faced fiction of the kind
dear to the heart of the medieval pleader" in William Prosser, Transferred Intent,
45 TEX. L. REv. 650, 650 (1967).
63. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1170 (4th ed. 1968).
64. "Despite ... the central role which the concept of intention plays in
the criminal law, we still lack a clear or agreed account of its meaning." R.A.
DUFF, INTENTION, AGENCY, & CRIMINAL LIABILrv 15 (1990).
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even when he does not desire them-that is, uncertainty about
whether so-called "oblique intentions" are a kind of intention-
has led many legislators to replace the vague concept of inten-
tion with the relatively clear concepts of purpose and knowledge.
As a result, many codes now define murder as purposely or know-
ingly causing the death of another human being.65 This replace-
ment of intention with purpose and knowledge may well have
broadened, but certainly has not narrowed the scope of murder.
All intentional killings are performed either purposely or know-
ingly, even if the converse is open to debate. 6
This change is important for the purpose at hand. Under
the new definition, no issue of criminal liability depends on
whether intentions can transfer. The controversy is no longer
relevant to the rationale for holding Smith liable for murder.
Instead, the crucial issue is whether purpose or knowledge-the
culpable states that have replaced intention in the definition of
murder-can transfer. Although the question of whether inten-
tions can transfer may seem difficult, the parallel questions about
knowledge and purpose are relatively easy. Neither purpose nor
knowledge can be thought to transfer without doing grave vio-
lence to our understanding of these concepts.
Knowledge cannot literally transfer. Knowledge that P is not
knowledge that Q even when P entails or is identical to Q
Undoubtedly, Smith did not kill White knowingly in the para-
digm case; he was not "practically certain" that his bullet would
miss Black and hit White.6 8 Just as obviously, purpose cannot lit-
erally transfer.6 9 No sleight-of-hand can transform a purpose to
bring about a state of affairs X into a purpose to bring about a
state of affairs Y, unless perhaps X is a means to Y. Clearly, Smith
did not have the "conscious object" to kill White. y° Thus neither
65. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(1)(a) (1962). § 2.10.2(1)(b) creates
liability for "depraved-heart" murder, when the defendant exhibits an extreme
indifference to the value of human life.
66. According to one commentator, "courts are almost equally divided on
the question" of whether knowledge "either is or should be a sufficient
condition of intention." ALAN WHITE, MISLEADING CASES 50-51 (1991).
67. Such judgments are said to be referentially opaque. See QUINE, supra
note 29, at 141-46.
68. Thus Smith fails to satisfy the statutory definition of knowledge of
consequences in MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (b) (ii) (1962).
69. Since purpose cannot transfer, then, if purpose is the mens rea of
attempt, the doctrine of transferred intent is inapplicable to attempt. See the
discussion in Elaine Devoe, Note, Criminal Law-The Use of Transferred Intent in
Attempted Murder, a Specific Intent Crime: State v. Gillette, 17 N.M. L. REv. 189
(1987).
70. Thus Smith fails to satisfy the statutory definition of purpose with
respect to consequences in MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a)(i) (1962).
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knowledge nor purpose-the culpable states that have replaced
intention in the definition of murder in the Model Penal Code-
can transfer. Since all intentional killings are performed either
purposely or knowingly, and these latter culpable states cannot
transfer, it seems highly unlikely that intentions can transfer.
Thus I reach the same conclusion that many commentators
have taken for granted without argument: the doctrine of trans-
ferred intent is indeed a legal fiction. Henceforth I will use the
word "deem" to remain mindful of the fictitious character of this
doctrine. 1 Smith's intention to kill Black does not literally trans-
fer to White; his original intention is not somehow transformed
into a different intention. Instead, when his bullet hits and kills
White, the criminal law deems his intention to kill Black to be an
intention to kill White. Or, in the terminology of modem crimi-
nal codes, the criminal law deems Smith's purpose to kill Black to
be a purpose to kill White. Smith is convicted of murder because
the criminal law deems him to possess the requisite culpable
state.
I do not insist that purists are correct to deny that fictions
might have a viable place in legal theory. Perhaps there are good
reasons for the criminal law to deem Smith to have an intention
that he actually lacks." Unfortunately, however, a fiction is
unhelpful for the task at hand. The existence of type A and B
deviations indicates that some intentions to kill are deemed to
transfer, while others are not. Invoking a fictitious doctrine to
"explain" why the defendant should be punished for murder in
the paradigm case or in type A deviations provides no guidance
about the remaining cases. Why not resort to this fiction in type
B deviations as well? Well, intentions just do not transfer under
71. Commentators who denounce the doctrine of transferred intent as a
legal fiction use similar (although not identical) terminology. LaFave and Scott
write: "What is really meant, by this round-about method of explanation [that
invokes transferred intent] is that when one person (A) acts (or omits to act)
with intent to harm another person (B), but because of a bad aim he instead
harms a third person (C) whom he did not intend to harm, the law considers
him (as it ought) just as guilty as if he had actually harmed the intended
victim." LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 2, at 399-400 (emphasis added).
72. One commentator protests against the tendency to regard this fiction
as a "perfidious trick." Instead, he contends that this fiction merely indicates
that the sense of intention in the criminal law diverges from that in ordinary
language. See C. Hall, A Defense of the Doctrine of Transferred Malice-Its Place in the
Nigerian Criminal Code, 34 ITr'L. & COMp. L. Q. 805, 810 (1985). But if the sense
of intention used in the criminal law is technical and divorced from everyday
usage, commentators have no place to turn to resolve nonstandard examples
about which courts have disagreed. For a sustained argument in favor of an
ordinary language interpretation of legal concepts such as intention, see
WHrrE, supra note 66.
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these circumstances. And here the story ends. In this context,
the fiction operates as a substitute for careful thought; it is noth-
ing more than a label to which persons appeal to reach judg-
ments that they accept intuitively, while providing no assistance
for those cases about which their intuitions are ambivalent or
silent.
Moreover, if a fiction is indeed required, there seems to be
no good reason to endorse this fiction rather than some alterna-
tive. After all, there are fictions other than transferred intent
that could be created to convict Smith of murder. As long as we
are clear that our doctrines are fictitious, why not reject premise
(3) in the argument for the necessity of transferred intent
instead of premise (4)? Smith could be convicted of murderjust
as surely by the simple expedient of deeming Black to be dead.
Call this fiction the doctrine of transferred death. Why not say that
the law "deems" Black to be dead when Smith shoots at him with
the intention to kill, but misses and kills White instead? If the
doctrine of transferred death is vulnerable to the objection that
the living cannot be dead, one wonders why the doctrine of
transferred intent is not equally vulnerable to the objection that
the culpable states required for murder cannot be transferred.
Silliness has no bounds once doctrines are conceded to be
fictitious.
But how can a fiction be avoided if Smith is to be punished
for murder? Purists probably win the debate against abolitionists
in insisting that Smith has not killed White intentionally and
therefore has not committed murder as defined in premise (1).
No alchemy can transform an unintentional killing into an inten-
tional killing. The key to punishing Smith as a murderer while
avoiding fictions is to realize that the conclusion of the argument
for the necessity of transferred intent-that Smith is not guilty of
murder-does not preclude punishing him as severely as a mur-
derer. Only a principle about deserved punishments can justify
treating Smith as a murderer while avoiding fictions. In other
words, a defensible rationale must specify the conditions under
which the severity of punishment of a given defendant should be
made equal to that of another defendant, even if they have com-
mitted different crimes. Such a principle purports to justify pun-
ishing Smith as severely as a murderer; that is, it endeavors to
support the conclusion that Smith should be treated as a mur-
derer-even though he has not actually committed murder.
Thus I have tried to be careful to avoid the preposition "for" in
describing my position; Smith should be treated as a murderer,
although he is not literally punished for murder. Those whose
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intuitions support the doctrine of transferred intent have no rea-
son to ask for more.
My proposal to treat cases of transferred intent within sen-
tencing theory rather than within the substantive criminal law is
novel, but not radical. Some considerations that bear on the
severity of the punishment that a defendant deserves are part of
the substantive criminal law, while other such considerations are
applied at the time of sentencing. No sound theory differenti-
ates between the two kinds of considerations. Suppose, for exam-
ple, that a defendant assaults a victim who is especially vulnerable
due to age or physical condition. Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, the punishment of this defendant is made more
severe than for ordinary assault.7" This defendant is not guilty of
committing the distinct crime of "assaulting an especially vulner-
able victim." Cases of transferred intent could be treated within
sentencing guidelines as well. The severity of Smith's punish-
ment could be adjusted to whatever degree is necessary to make
it equivalent to that imposed on the ordinary murderer. No spe-
cial or fictitious doctrine of the substantive criminal law is
required to reach this result.
In what follows, I will critically examine two non-fictitious
rationales that might be incorporated within sentencing guide-
lines tojustify our intuitions and help resolve nonstandard exam-
ples of transferred intent. Neither rationale purports to identify
the conditions under which intentions really transfer; no theory
can salvage the doctrine of transferred intent as literally con-
strued. I have already dismissed the suggestion that the culpable
states required for murder are the kind of things that can be
transformed. These rationales could be understood as identifying
the conditions under which intentions are deemed to transfer.
But a theorist who subscribes to either rationale no longer needs
the doctrine of transferred intent to explain why Smith should be
punished as a murderer. Thus these rationales do not support
the doctrine of transferred intent as much as they provide an
alternative to it. Fictions should be created only if they are
required to avoid injustice, and both the rationales I will examine
render the doctrine of transferred intent superfluous. Smith
should be punished as a murderer not because his intention to
kill Black is deemed to be transferred to White, but because the
severity of the punishment he deserves can be justified by a non-
fictitious principle in sentencing theory.
73. SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND PoLIcY STATEMENTS § 3Al.1 (U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1987).
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An adequate theory of transferred intent must sort our intu-
itions in the appropriate way, that is, it must account for our
judgments about the paradigm case as well as about type A and B
deviations. But we derive little benefit from reinforcing what we
already know. The real advantage of a theory-as opposed to a
fiction-is that it offers some guidance for resolving those cases
about which we are undecided.
VI. THE COMPENSATION FOR LUCK THESIS
Some courts7 4 and commentators75 apparently believe that
the best non-fictitious rationale for punishing Smith as a mur-
derer invokes what I will call the compensation for luck thesis.
According to this thesis, two defendants DI and D2 should be
punished to the same extent if the only characteristics that differ-
entiate them are due to luck. In this Part, I will critically examine
this thesis, and argue that it fails to provide a suitable rationale
for our judgments about many cases of transferred intent.
According to the rationale I will explore here, the fiction of
transferred intent is a specific doctrine that implements a more
general, non-fictitious thesis that compensates for luck in assess-
ments of criminal liability. This thesis may seem to have the
potential to explain the paradigm case. Consider Jones, who
commits an undisputed case of murder after hitting and killing
his intended victim. Surely it is simply a matter of luck that
Smith, unlike Jones, missed his intended victim and killed some-
one else instead. If the luck that distinguishes Smith from Jones
is removed from consideration, nothing of moral relevance is left
to differentiate their respective degrees of blame and liability.
Thus they deserve the same quantum of punishment.
Applications of the compensation for luck thesis require
some understanding of the role that luck actually plays in human
affairs. Here commentators have disagreed, and might even be
said to have floundered. Whether something is or is not attribu-
table to luck requires a baseline of comparison-an appraisal of
what the world would have been like in the absence of luck-and
no clear basis for making such judgments is available. Once the
presence of luck is posited, theorists are likely to find it every-
74. In explaining the rationale for the. doctrine of transferred intent, one
judge remarked that "but for the transferred intent doctrine, [defendants who
accidentally kill innocent bystanders, while failing to kill their intended victims]
could escape punishment for murder . . . because of their "lucky" mistake.
People v. Birreuta, 208 Cal. Rptr. 635, 638-39 (Ct. App. 1984).
75. "What the courts have essentially done in [cases of transferred intent]
is to rule out the role of luck." Kessler, supra note 13, at 2207.
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where-or nowhere. Why stop the search by conceding that luck
explains why Smith, unlike Jones, missed his intended victim and
hit someone else instead? It seems just as much a matter of luck
that Smith hit anyone at all. For that matter, it seems just as
much a matter of luck that Jones hit his intended victim. Why
attribute Smith's bad aim to luck, but not Jones' good aim?
From the standpoint of luck, their cases are hard to distinguish
from that of Brown, who missed both his intended victim and the
bystander. If we endeavor to compensate for the effects of luck
in assessments of criminal liability, why should Smith, Jones or
Brown receive different amounts of punishment?
If these defendants should be punished only for what is not
a matter of luck, then perhaps they should be guilty only for what
they share in common-their attempts to kill. The success of
Smith and Jones in actually killing should not raise their degree
of blame any more than Brown's lack of success in actually killing
should lower it. Arguably, a defendant who attempts to kill
should be liable for the same offense as a defendant who suc-
ceeds. A few commentators have reached this very conclusion.
They hold that persons should be liable only for what they
attempt, and not for the actual consequences of their actions.7 6
But the problem is not solved by holding defendants liable
only for what they attempt. After all, it is just as much a matter of
luck that Smith, Jones or Brown managed to commit an attempt.
Luck seems to be involved in the fact that their cars did not stall
on their way to the place of the shooting, making it difficult to
convict them even of a criminal attempt. And I have only begun
to scratch the surface in suggesting how assessments of criminal
liability might be affected by a systematic endeavor to compen-
sate for the effect of luck.7 7 There is no good reason to disregard
the role that luck plays in explaining how persons come to have
their intentions, inclinations, capacities, and temperaments.7"
No jurisdiction has systematically endeavored to compensate
for luck in assessments of criminal liability. At most, the applica-
tion of the compensation for luck thesis has been limited to situa-
tions in which Smith actually killed someone, albeit someone
76. For one of many such examples, see James Gobert, The Fortuity of
Consequences, 4 CiuM. L. F. 1 (1993).
77. Ultimately, the attempt to compensate for luck in assessments of
criminal liability is hard pressed to explain why anyone should ever be
criminally liable for anything at all. For a thoughtful discussion of these
matters, see Michael Moore, The Independent Moral Significance of Wrongdoing, 5J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 237 (1994).
78. This category is called constitutive luck in THOMAS NAGEL, MORTAL
QUESTIONS 28 (1979).
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other than his intended victim. As far as I can see, there is no
principled basis for limiting the application of the compensation
for luck thesis to this kind of situation. In other words, the com-
pensation for luck thesis, if applied less selectively, would support
far more sweeping and radical conclusions than the doctrine of
transferred intent. If so, it is hard to see how this doctrine could
be understood to implement the more general compensation for
luck thesis.
I claim no originality on behalf of the foregoing difficulties
with the compensation for luck thesis. These problems have
long been familiar both to moral philosophers and to legal theo-
rists. What may escape notice is that the compensation for luck
thesis is unhelpful in effectively sorting our intuitions about the
nonstandard cases of transferred intent. Arguably, this thesis
renders all nonstandard examples amenable to the same solu-
tion. Consider just one of the type B deviations. In example
seven, the act by which the defendant attempts to kill his
intended victim is not the proximate cause of the death of his
unintended victim; the killing takes place through a deviant
causal chain. Surely luck is involved in the fact that the causal
chain that led to the death of the unintended victim is deviant.
Does the compensation for luck thesis thus require that this
example should be reclassified as a type A deviation? Such a
reclassification is counterintuitive.
If the compensation for luck thesis misfires when applied to
cases about which we are relatively confident, it has even less
potential to assist us with several type C deviations-those exam-
ples that motivated the search for a general rationale in the first
place. This suspicion is confirmed by returning to just one of
these examples. In the fifth deviation, the defendant hits and
injures but fails to kill his intended victim. What are we to con-
clude about this case if we endeavor to compensate for luck? We
can emphasize the victim's good luck in surviving his wound. Or
we can emphasize the victim's bad luck in having been wounded
at all. The compensation for luck thesis points in both direc-
tions-or in neither. As far as I can see, this thesis brings us no
closer to a resolution of this example. The compensation for
luck thesis fails to provide a general rationale to support our
judgments about transferred intent.
VII. THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONATE SENTENCES
Since the compensation for luck thesis does not account for
our judgments about transferred intent, commentators should
seek an alternative rationale. In this Part, I will apply what I call
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the principle of proportionate sentences. According to this principle,
the punishment a defendant deserves should be proportionate to
the seriousness of his criminal conduct.79 The principle of pro-
portionate sentences requires parity in sentences when two
defendants commit equally serious crimes. Here I assume that
the seriousness of criminal conduct is a function of two vari-
ables-harm and culpability.8" If DI and D2 act with the same
culpability, and proximately cause the same harm, then they
must have committed equally serious crimes. If DI is and ought
to be punished for murder-the most serious crime-and D2
has committed a crime of equal seriousness, then D2 should be
punished to the same extent as a murderer.
The principle of proportionate sentences is superior to the
compensation for luck thesis. Recall that the latter thesis
encountered difficulties even when applied to the paradigm case.
But the principle of proportionate sentences has a straightfor-
ward application here. Smith has proximately caused the death
of a human being, so he has produced the same harm as Jones,
the undisputed murderer. In addition, Smith possesses the same
level of culpability as Jones. Thus their criminal conduct is
equally serious, and the principle of proportionate sentences
requires parity in punishment. Smith and Jones could not be
punished to different degrees without violating the principle of
proportionate sentences. 1
Consider next the application of the principle of propor-
tionate sentences to some of the deviations about which our intu-
itions are clear. Most of these examples are easy. In example
two, a defendant intended to kill Blackie the duck, but killed a
human being instead. Since the consequence intended-if it is a
harm at all-is far less grave than the harm of homicide, the
principle of proportionate sentences requires disparity in punish-
ment and precludes treating the defendant as a murderer. In
79. The principle of proportionate sentences is a cornerstone of desert-
based theories of punishment. For a sustained defense, see ANDREW VON
HIRSCH, DOING JUSrIcE (1976); ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FuruRE CRIMES?
(1985); and ANDREW VON HIRSCH, CENSURE AND SANcTION (1993).
80. Of course, any other variable that might differentiate the seriousness
of the crime committed by D1 from the seriousness of the crime committed by
D2 must be held constant in order to apply the principle of proportionate
sentences. Motive is one such possible variable. See the discussion in Douglas
Husak, Motive and Criminal Liability, 8 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 3 (1989).
81. The principle of proportionate sentences is subject to a ceteris paribus
clause. The precise scope of such a clause is open to dispute, but its main
function is to hold constant those offender characteristics-such as prior criminal
record-that might allow DI to be punished more severely than D2, even when
their criminal conduct is equally serious.
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example six, a defendant killed by mistake rather than by acci-
dent. Since both the harm that is caused and the culpability of
the defendant are equivalent to those of the murderer, the prin-
ciple of proportionate sentences requires parity in punishment
between the defendant and the murderer.
Thus far, the principle of proportionate sentences seems
capable of sorting our intuitions into the appropriate categories.
Does this principle also overcome some of the general problems
I raised against the compensation for luck thesis? I believe so.
The greatest difficulty with the former thesis is that it knew no
bounds; without agreement about the role of luck in human
affairs, a systematic attempt to compensate for luck has the
potential to undermine much of the criminal law as we know it.
What are the limits of the principle of proportionate sentences?
Admittedly, these boundaries are not easy to define. Theorists
lack a principled basis to decide difficult questions about either
of the two variables that determine the seriousness of crime.
Commentators might debate about whether one consequence is
more or less harmful than another,"2 as well as about whether
one state is more or less culpable than another.83 Even a good
theory cannot always make hard cases easy. We may seem to be
in the same predicament as the theorist who endeavored to com-
pensate for the role of luck.
Fortunately, however, our present prospects may not be
quite so bleak. There is a surprising level of agreement among
persons about whether one crime is more or less serious than
another.8 4 Moreover, there should be no dispute about whether
two consequences are equally harmful, or two states are equally
culpable, when they are the identical type.85 This basis of agree-
82. See the approach taken in Andrew von Hirsch & Nils Jareborg,
Gauging Criminal Harm: A Living-Standard Analysis, 11 OxFoRD J. LEGAL STUD. 1
(1991).
83. Oftentimes two states are said to be equally culpable even though
they are distinct. Willful ignorance, for example, is frequently said to be as
culpable as the distinct state of knowledge. For a critical discussion of this
supposed equivalence, see Douglas Husak & Craig Callender, Willful Ignorance,
Knowledge, and the "Equal Culpability" Thesis: A Study of the Deeper Significance of the
Principle of Legality, 1994 Wis. L. REV. 29. A moral theory that holds distinct
states to be equally culpable is inevitably controversial. See Michael Moore,
Intentions and Mens Rea, in ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 245
(Ruth Gavison ed., 1987).
84. See THORSTEN SELLIN & MARVIN WOLFGANG, THE MEASUREMENT OF
DELINQUENCY (1964).
85. I do not mean to minimize the difficulties in determining when two
mental states are of the identical type.
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ment provides the best hope for applying the principle of pro-
portionate sentences to resolve some of the type C deviations.
In example four, a defendant kills one or more bystanders
in the course of killing his intended victim. Is he guilty of multi-
ple murders? Theorists who apply the principle of proportionate
sentences would approach this question by comparing the seri-
ousness of the crime(s) committed by this defendant (D1) with
those of another defendant (D2) who intentionally killed more
than one person. Have DI and D2 committed equally serious
crimes? If not, it must be possible to differentiate D1 and D2 by
either the amount of harm they have proximately caused or by
their respective levels of culpability. D2, it seems clear, causes
more harm and is more culpable than DI; to intend to kill sev-
eral persons is more culpable than to intend to cause a single
death.8 6 Thus the principle of proportionate sentences requires
D1 to be punished less severely than D2.
In example five, a defendant kills the bystander, but also
inflicts a nonfatal wound on his intended victim. Again, the
question is whether the defendant should be guilty of more than
one intentional crime. No progress is made here by debating
whether a single intent against the wounded victim is "used up,"
or whether there is "enough intent to go around."" Nor is the
approach of the Model Penal Code especially helpful. It seems
unproductive to limit the inquiry to whether the causal chain
that led to the death of the bystander is "too remote or acciden-
tal in its occurrence to have a Uust] bearing on the actor's liabil-
ity." " Instead, the principle of proportionate sentences should
be applied. The analysis proceeds as in the foregoing example.
A defendant (D2) who intends both to kill and to wound is more
culpable than a defendant (DI) who intends only to kill. Thus
D2 deserves to be punished more severely than DI.
Not all of the nonstandard examples are amenable to this
solution. In example eight, the unintended victim was not
clearly visible to the defendant. Thus the defendant was proba-
bly not reckless with respect to the death of his victim. Suppose
that the defendant was not even negligent with respect to his vic-
tim. In this example, the principle of proportionate sentences
requires parity in the amount of punishment imposed on DI and
D2. The defendant causes the same harm as the undisputed
86. See the rationale invoked in People v. Birreuta, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
For a challenge to the claim that an intention to kill many persons is more
culpable than an intention to kill one, see John Taurek, Should the Numbers
Count?, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFt. 293 (1977).
87. See DRESSLER, supra note 25.
88. MODEL PENAL CODE, § 2.03(2)(b) (1962).
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murderer, and possesses the same level of culpability. Since
neither the amount of harm they proximately cause nor their
level of culpability suffice to differentiate them, their criminal
conduct is equally serious. Thus I am inclined to punish both
with equal severity.
This example, more than any other, indicates the need for a
theory of transferred intent. Despite Williams' admonition that
the "plain man's view of justice" suggests that this defendant
should not be punished as a murderer, 9 commentators report
conflicting intuitions here. As far as I can see, the compensation
for luck thesis provides absolutely no assistance in resolving this
example. The principle of proportionate sentences, however, is
easier to apply. Whether it produces an acceptable outcome is
perhaps the most important test of the adequacy of my approach.
Some examples, however, are not so clearly resolved by an
application of the principle of proportionate sentences. In
example nine, a statute augments the punishment for killing
either the intended or the unintended victim. Here the applica-
tion of the principle of proportionate sentences is murky. The
crux of the problem is that there is no clear justification for aug-
menting the punishment of a defendant who kills a person with a
given legal status. If the killing of a police officer, for example, is
judged to be a greater harm than the killing of an ordinary citi-
zen, the principle of proportionate sentences might provide a.
basis to impose a more severe punishment on a defendant who
causes the greater harm. But the augmented punishment might
be justified by a supposed greater need to deter the killing of
police officers, rather than by a judgment about the magnitude
of the harm involved. Without an answer to the question of
whether different consequences are equally harmful, no clear
outcome is produced by applying the principle of proportionate
sentences.
The principle of proportionate sentences can be hard to
apply for additional reasons. A few examples cannot be resolved
without a comprehensive theory about very different areas of the
substantive criminal law. In example ten, for example, an
intended victim deliberately interposed one or more innocent
persons as shields. And in example twelve, a defendant killed
many innocent persons in the course of defending himself. The
principle of proportionate sentences offers an incomplete per-
spective in such situations. The resolution of these kinds of
89. WilLiAMs, supra note 18, at 133.
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examples awaits a detailed theory about what persons are permit-
ted to do in the course of exercising their right of self-defense.9"
Does the principle of proportionate sentences have accepta-
ble implications when applied to kinds of situations not yet con-
sidered? I am somewhat troubled by its application to examples
typically treated under the rubric of concurrence. In one well-
known such case,9 the defendant wounded his victim with the
intent to kill. Believing his victim to be dead, he disposed of
what he thought to be a corpse. The cause of death was not the
initial wound, but the subsequent act of disposal. The principle
of proportionate sentences would allow this defendant to be pun-
ished as a murderer. Although some commentators have
expressed reservations about this result, a contrary outcome
strikes me as counterintuitive. I tentatively suggest that cases of
concurrence might be resolved by reference to the same general
rationale I have invoked in cases of transferred intent. Although
I cannot pursue this suggestion here, it may provide an addi-
tional test of the general adequacy of my proposal to apply the
principle of proportionate sentences to cases of transferred
intent.
I suspect that the application of the principle of proportion-
ate sentences will turn out to sort most (but not all) of the type C
deviations into the type B category. This result should not be
surprising. Since few of the deviations about which our intu-
itions are clear were classified as type A, one might anticipate
that few of the deviations about which our intuitions are unclear
would ultimately fall into this category. The doctrine of trans-
ferred intent does not apply only to the paradigm case, but it
applies somewhat sparingly to the deviations from the paradigm
that I have constructed.
VIII. CONCLUSION
I began by presenting the paradigm case of transferred
intent. I reconstructed the argument for the necessity of the doc-
trine of transferred intent, and critically discussed the various
reasons that commentators might advance for believing it to be
unsound. The purist alternative gains plausibility if this argu-
ment is accepted. But the purist approach is subject to difficul-
ties of its own. I generated various kinds of nonstandard
examples of transferred intent, that is, examples with specified
characteristics that deviate from the paradigm. Unless the aboli-
90. For one such theory, see SUZANNE UNIACKE, PERMISSIBLE KILLING
(1994).
91. Thabo Meli v. Regina, 1 W.L.R. 228, 1 All E.R. 393 (1954).
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tionist approach is endorsed, a rationale to punish any of these
defendants as murderers must be found within sentencing theory
rather than within the substantive criminal law. I have argued
that the principle of proportionate sentences is preferable to the
compensation for luck thesis in providing a non-fictitious basis to
resolve both paradigm and nonstandard cases of transferred
intent. This principle provides the basis for a theory of trans-
ferred intent. At the very least, I hope to have established the
need for such a theory, as the intuitions of many commentators
are silent or ambivalent when examples diverge from the familiar
paradigm case of transferred intent with which I began.

